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11 Introduction
In the homogeneous good case the relationship between the distribution of
marginal costs and consumer surplus as well as producer surplus and, there-
fore, social surplus was studied in extensive manner. Producer surplus in-
creases with the variance of (constant) marginal costs whereas consumer sur-
plus solely depends on average marginal costs. In case of a mean preserving
cost variation total costs of production decrease with the variance of marginal
costs.1 Gross revenue solely depends on aggregated output which again de-
pends on average marginal costs. Therefore, producer surplus increases with
the variance of marginal costs.2 Consumer surplus, however, is unchanged in
case of a mean preserving cost variation since market price only depends on
aggregated output which again depends on average marginal costs.
This paper carries on this analysis to the diﬀerentiated good context.3 In
many industries the assumption of homogeneous goods is not appropriate since
goods are rather less perfectly substitutable than perfect substitutes. In my
analysis I do not focus on vertically diﬀerentiated goods but on horizontally
diﬀerentiated products. Each ﬁrm incurs constant but diﬀerent marginal costs.
Firms cost structure is the sole reason for market heterogeneity since products
not diﬀer in quality.4 In contrast to the homogeneous good case consumer
surplus is expected to decrease with the variance of marginal costs at ﬁrst
sight. Since goods are diﬀerentiated not only industry output but also its dis-
tribution on the diﬀerent ﬁrms is crucial for households’ utility since there is
a diminishing marginal utility of each good. Given a ﬁxed amount of industry
output an even distribution on each variety would maximize households’ utility.
Since equilibrium output and respective marginal costs are inversely propor-
tional, consumer surplus is expected to decrease with the variance of marginal
costs. As you can see in the course of the analysis households’ gross utility
1Salant and Shaﬀer (1999) useing results from Bergstrom and Varian (1985) show that
aggregate costs of production strictly decrease with the variance of marginal costs.
2Van Long and Soubeyran (2001) show that industry proﬁts is an increasing function of
the variance of the marginal costs if the average of marginal costs is constant.
3Corch´ on and Zudenkova (2009) use a similar model but analyze welfare losses under im-
perfect Cournot competition. Assuming Dixit-utility they continue the analysis of Corch´ on
(2008).
4Quality diﬀerences could easily be implemented in my analysis. However, Symeonidis
(2003) already showed that consumer surplus as well as producer surplus increase with
the variance of quality levels if average quality is constant. Intuitively, quality diﬀerences
may reinforce or counteract the eﬀects of changes in cost structure. But, the simultaneous
analysis of both cost and quality diﬀerences yields no additional insight.
2actually decrease with the variance of marginal costs. Moreover, consumer
surplus should decrease with market heterogeneity since ﬁrms have market
power to choose prices above the competitive level since goods are less good
substitutable. Market power should be proﬁtable for producers but harmful
for consumers. But, it can be shown that the exact opposite is true. In case
of a diﬀerentiated goods consumer surplus as well as producer surplus increase
with the variance of marginal costs.
Assuming standard quadratic utility originated by Dixit (1979) I consider
an oligopoly consisting of n ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces a variety of a diﬀeren-
tiated good and incurs constant but diﬀerent marginal costs without ﬁxed
costs. In the light of the analysis of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) the assump-
tion of Cournot competition is reasonable in capacity constraint industries.5
Firms exhibit diﬀerent but constant marginal costs without ﬁxed costs. Since
preferences are quasi-linear social surplus is the measure for Pareto-optimality.
In analogy to F´ evrier and Linnemer (2004) the impact of an arbitrary marginal
costs variation on consumer surplus and producer surplus and, therefore, so-
cial surplus is decomposed into an average impact and a heterogeneity impact.
The former lets the variance of marginal costs unchanged whereas the latter
is a mean preserving cost variation.
In case of homogeneous goods an increase of all marginal costs can be
welfare if there is an output shift from ineﬃcient ﬁrms to eﬃcient ﬁrms. Ac-
cording to Kimmel (1992) this reallocation increases producer surplus and
overcompensates diminishing consumer surplus (Seade (1985)) if inverse de-
mand is suﬃciently concave and the disparity of output levels is suﬃciently
high. Since inverse demand is linear in case of Dixit utility the average impact
on all surpluses is negative (positive) if all ﬁrms are negatively (positively)
aﬀected by the cost variation. The results concerning the average impact co-
incide with the homogeneous good case.
The analysis of the heterogeneity impact, however, yields striking new re-
sults. Indeed, households’ gross utility decrease with the variance of marginal
costs. Comparable to the homogeneous good case aggregated output solely de-
pends on average marginal costs. Since there is a diminishing marginal utility
of all goods gross utility decreases with the variance of marginal costs. But, ag-
gregated households expenditures decrease with the variance of marginal costs,
5Note that the assumption of quantity competition is not crucial for the results. My
results are robust with respect to the type of competition or the utility function. Assuming
Shubik (1980) utility I come to same results.
3too. Since diminishing aggregated expenditures outweigh declining gross util-
ity consumer surplus increase with the variance of marginal costs in case of
a mean preserving cost variation. In contrast to the homogeneous good case
gross revenue (equal to aggregated expenditures) decrease with the variance
of marginal costs. Nevertheless, producer surplus increase with the variance
of marginal costs since diminishing total costs of production overcompensate
declining gross revenue.
The intuition behind this result is the following: In case of a cost variation
which increases the variance of marginal costs there is an output shift from
less eﬃcient to more eﬃcient ﬁrms and vice versa. This result coincide with
those of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) since they show that an output reduction
of a single ﬁrm increases social surplus if market concentration increases suf-
ﬁciently. This happens if a fairly ineﬃcient and, therefore, small ﬁrm reduces
its output whereas its more eﬃcient competitors increase their output levels.
Even though aggregated output declines and, therefore, consumers are worse
oﬀ, social surplus increases since increasing producer surplus outweighs. In
case of a mean preserving cost variation there is a simultaneous increase of the
output level of a more eﬃcient ﬁrm which reinforces this positive eﬀect on wel-
fare. My results hold true for all marginal costs combinations corresponding
with non-negative output levels of all ﬁrms. Thus, my analysis generalizes
the results of those authors analyzing negative welfare eﬀects of marginal cost
reductions of ineﬃcient ﬁrms6 since my results require no threshold values for
marginal costs or market shares.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the following section
describes the framework of the model. Section 3 presents the central results.
Section 4 ﬁnally concludes.
6For the ﬁrst time Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that a reduction of the marginal costs of
a single ﬁrm may reduce welfare if the ﬁrm is relatively ineﬃcient. Zhao (2001) continues
the analysis of Lahiri and Ono (1988) and derives threshold values for marginal cost and
respective market shares such that a cost reduction reduces welfare. Smythe and Zhao (2006)
reﬁne the analysis of Zhao (2001) and allow for nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs as well
as technological spill-over. Wang and Zhao (2007) extend the analysis of Lahiri and Ono
(1988) and Zhao (2001) in the diﬀerentiated good context. Assuming a utility originated by
Shubik (1980) they derive conditions under which marginal cost reductions reduce welfare
in Cournot and Bertrand competition.
42 The model
Consider a market consisting of n ﬁrms each of them producing one variety
of a diﬀerentiated good Qi with i = 1,...,n. Abstracting from ﬁxed cost,
each ﬁrm incurs constant marginal cost ci. Let denote qi the quantity of
good i produced by ﬁrm i. The quasi-linear preferences of the representative
household are described by a quadratic utility according to Dixit (1979). The
corresponding inverse demand of good i = 1,...,n is given as follows:
pi = 1 − qi − νQ−i (2.1)
Let Q−i :=
P
j6=i qj denote aggregated output of i’s competitors. The pa-
rameter of substitution is given by ν. For ν > 0 the goods are substitutes and
for ν < 0 the goods are complements. In case of ν = 0 there are n indepen-
dent goods. To secure that utility is concave the parameter of substitution





. For further insight see appendix A. Each
ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt choosing an optimal quantity. Let Q∗ denote aggre-
gated output in equilibrium. Summing up the n ﬁrst order conditions given
by 1 − 2q∗
i − νQ∗




2 + ν(n − 1)
(2.2)
Let c := 1
n
Pn
i=1 ci denote average marginal cost which is assumed not to
exceed 1. Hence, similar to the homogenous good context, aggregated output
just depends on average marginal costs. Industry output Q∗ is unchanged by a
mean preserving cost variation. In contrast to aggregated output the derivation
of the equilibrium output q∗
i of ﬁrm i = 1,...,n is little more tricky. Therefore
the derivation is dedicated to the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 (Equilibrium output of a single ﬁrm) The equilibrium out-




(2 − ν) − [2 + ν(n − 2)]ci + ν
P
j6=i cj
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
Obviously equilibrium output q∗
i just depends on the sum of competitors
marginal cost and not its distribution. This will be crucial for some results as
you can see below. As shown in the appendix corresponding equilibrium price
p∗
i is given by p∗
i = q∗















To ensure non-negative equilibrium output of all n ﬁrms I assume p∗
i −ci =
q∗
i ≥ 0 for i = 1,...,n. Solving q∗
i ≥ 0 for ci yields the expression is the
following assumption:
Assumption 2.1 (Oligopoly of n ﬁrms) To ensure an oligopoly consisting
of n ﬁrms, I assume q∗




2 + ν(n − 2)
+
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Note that in case of substitutes assumption 2.1 requires that marginal cost
must never exceed 1 (equal to the maximum willingness to pay). In case of
complements, however, marginal cost may exceed 1 if rivals are suﬃciently
eﬃcient. This is due to the eﬀect, that in case of complements the willingness
to pay for a good increases with the consumption of rivals output which in
turn is in reverse proportion to respective marginal cost.
3 Results
In the following the central results concerning producer surplus, consumer
surplus and social surplus are presented. In the terminology of F´ evrier and
Linnemer (2004) the impact of an arbitrary cost variation on the aforemen-
tioned variables is decomposed into an average and a heterogeneity impact.
The average component comprises cost variations such that the variance is
unchanged. The heterogeneity component comprises a change of the variance
of marginal costs whereas average marginal costs is unchanged.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Average and heterogeneity impact) Let denote AIF the
average impact on the function F and HIF the heterogeneity impact on F re-
spective. In my study F is given by producer surplus, consumer surplus and





average impact is characterized by dc1 = ... = dcn = dc. Without loss of gen-
erality the heterogeneity impact is given by a variation of ck and cl with k < l
such that dck = −dcl > 0. The average impact AIF and the heterogeneity












Note that any arbitrary cost variation can be decomposed into these two
components. As you can see in the appendix the directional vectors given in
deﬁnition 3.1 just equal the Eigenvectors given by (B.2). The above deﬁned
decomposition just equals a principle axis transformation.
3.1 Producer surplus
In the following the relationship between producer surplus and the distribu-
tion of marginal costs is analyzed. Are producers better oﬀ in case of more
heterogeneous market structures as suspected by antitrust authorities? Does







−i) is just the sum of the equilibrium
proﬁts of all ﬁrms. The impact of a cost variation on producer surplus is the
sum of impacts on each ﬁrm.
Proposition 3.1 (Average Impact) The average impact on the equilibrium
proﬁt of each ﬁrm and therefore the average impact on producer surplus is
positive (negative) if all ﬁrms are positively (negatively) aﬀected by the cost
variation.
Proof: The average impact on producer surplus is just the sum of the av-







































−[2 + ν(n − 2)] + ν(n − 1)






2 + ν(n − 1)
< 0 (3.2)










2 + ν(n − 1)
=
−2Q∗
2 + ν(n − 1)
< 0 (3.3)





per assumption the average impact on producer
surplus is positive (negative) if all ﬁrms are positively (negatively) aﬀected by
the cost variation. 
An increase of all marginal costs has two opposite eﬀects on the equilibrium
proﬁt of ﬁrm i. On the one hand, making i’s competitors less eﬃcient has a
positive eﬀect on i’s proﬁt since all substitutes of product i are getting more
expensive and, therefore, less attractive. This eﬀect is given by ν(n − 1) in
(3.1). On the other hand the ﬁrm self is disadvantaged by the increase of ci.
This eﬀect is given by −[2+ν(n−2)] in (3.1). Since the latter eﬀect outweighs
the former eﬀect each ﬁrm is disadvantaged by an increase of all marginal costs
and vice versa.
This result coincides with the homogenous good case since equilibrium
proﬁt of each ﬁrm and, therefore, producer surplus decrease if all ﬁrms are
negatively aﬀected in case of linear demand. If inverse demand is suﬃciently
high and inverse demand is concave enough there is a shift in production from
ineﬃcient ﬁrms to eﬃcient ﬁrms which makes producers better oﬀ and possi-
bly overcompensates consumer surplus losses such that social surplus increase.
Compare Seade (1985), Kimmel (1992) or F´ evrier and Linnemer (2004).
In the following the heterogeneity impact on producer surplus is analyzed.
This mean preserving cost variation lets average eﬃciency of the ﬁrms un-
changed. A big market share and a highly concentrated market is suspected
to promote market power. The exercise of market power is presumed to be
proﬁtable for ﬁrms. As you can see in the following proposition this presump-
tion is true.
Proposition 3.2 (Heterogeneity Impact) In case of a mean preserving
cost variation producer surplus increases with the variance of the marginal
costs.







i on equilibrium output q∗









2−ν, for i = k,
1
2−ν, for i = l,
0, else.
(3.4)
The heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium proﬁt of unaﬀected ﬁrms i 6= k,l
is zero. Hence, the heterogeneity impact on producer surplus is just the sum
of the heterogeneity impact on Π∗
k and Π∗












































(2 − ν)2(ck − cl) (3.5)
Thus, producer surplus increase with the variance of marginal costs. 
The intuition behind this result is the following: A ﬁrm which is positively
aﬀected by the cost variation beneﬁts due to two eﬀects: Firstly, respective
equilibrium output increases according to lemma 2.1. Secondly, its price-cost
margin increases, too (equation (2.3)). The reverse holds true for the ﬁrm
which is negatively aﬀected by the variation. In case of a cost variation which
increases the variance the ex ante more eﬃcient and, therefore, bigger ﬁrm is
getting even larger. Thus, additional proﬁt overcompensates the losses of the
ﬁrms which is negatively aﬀected by the cost variation.
Even though this result is comparable to the homogeneous good case7 it
is not self-evident in context of diﬀerentiated goods since there is an essential
eﬀect which counteracts: In the homogeneous good case gross revenue (equal to
households’ total expenditures) is constant in case of a mean preserving cost
variation. Remember that the equilibrium price solely depends on industry
output which in turn just depends on average marginal costs. Since total costs
of production decrease with the variance of marginal costs producers are better
oﬀ in case of more heterogeneous market structures. In context of diﬀerentiated
goods, however, gross revenue declines with the variance of marginal costs.
7Compare Bergstrom and Varian (1985) or F´ evrier and Linnemer (2004), for instance.
9Consequently, the heterogeneity impact on producer surplus is decomposed
into its components: gross revenue and total costs. The corresponding results
are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (Total revenue versus total cost) Both ﬁrms’ total revenue
and total costs decrease with the variance of marginal costs. The eﬀect of total
costs outweighs the eﬀect on total revenue. Hence producer surplus increases
(decreases) in case of a mean preserving cost variation which increases (de-
creases) the variance of marginal costs.
Thus, there is a positive relationship between market heterogeneity and
producer surplus as suspected by antitrust authorities. US Merger Guidelines,
for instance, presume that ﬁrms’ market power increase with market concen-
tration. The exercise of market power is presumed to be proﬁtable for ﬁrms
but harmful for consumers.8 As you have seen above the ﬁrst assumption is
true. But, as you can see below the second assumption is false.
3.2 Consumer surplus
As you have seen in the previous section producer surplus increases with the
variance of marginal costs. Thus, producers are better oﬀ in more heteroge-
neous market structures. The presumption of antitrust authorities that a big
market share and a highly concentrated market, respectively, promote market
power which is proﬁtable for producers seems to be true. But what about
the consumers? The exercise of market power is suspected to be detrimental
for competitiveness of the market and, therefore, should be harmful for con-
sumers. Remember that equilibrium proﬁt just equals squared quantity. The
price-cost margin equals equilibrium output. Thus, a big equilibrium output
corresponds with a big price-cost margin which indicates market power. This
market power should be harmful for consumers. Therefore, a homogeneous
market structure consisting of equipollent ﬁrms should provide more favorable
conditions for consumers. As you can see below the exact opposite is true.
Let CS






n) − U(m,0,...,0) denote con-
sumer surplus caused by the consumption of the n diﬀerentiated products q∗
i






i. Let m denote the income of the representative household
which is assumed to be exogenous.
8US Merger Guidelines: ’Other things being equal, market concentration aﬀects the
likelihood that one ﬁrm, or a small group of ﬁrms, could successfully exercise market power.’
10Proposition 3.3 (Average Impact) Consumer surplus increases (decreases)
if all ﬁrms are positively (negatively) aﬀected by the cost variation.
Increasing marginal costs of all ﬁrms decreases equilibrium quantities of all
brands and, therefore, industry output decrease, too. This makes consumers
unambiguously worse oﬀ. This result coincides with the homogeneous good
case. Compare F´ evrier and Linnemer (2004), for instance.
Let us now analyze the impact of a mean preserving cost variation on
consumer surplus. As aforementioned ﬁrms’ market power is suspected to
increase with respective market share and market concentration, respectively.
Price-cost margin is proportional to equilibrium output. In the homogeneous
good case consumers are indiﬀerent if average marginal costs is constant. In
the diﬀerentiated good context products are not perfectly substitutable and,
therefore, ﬁrms have market power. Moreover, there is a diminishing marginal
utility of each product. Hence, given a ﬁxed industry output consumers prefer
each brand in same quantity. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the exact
opposite is true.
Proposition 3.4 (Heterogeneity Impact) Consumer surplus increases with
the variance of marginal costs if average marginal costs are constant. In case
of perfect substitutes (i.e. ν = 1) consumer surplus is unchanged in case of a
mean preserving cost variation.
Proposition 3.4 is the central insight of present paper. Even though there
are many counter-arguments consumers are better oﬀ in heterogeneous mar-
ket structures. According to equation (2.2) aggregated output is unchanged
by a mean preserving cost variation. But, the disparity of output levels in-
creases with the variance of marginal costs. Normally, consumers prefer each
brand in same quantity. For a better understanding the heterogeneity impact
on consumer surplus is decomposed into its components: households’ utility
and aggregated expenditures. Since households expenditures’ just equal ﬁrms’
gross revenue, we can use (D.6) to show that households’ expenditures decline
with the variance of marginal costs. It remains to analyze the heterogeneity
impact on consumers’ gross utility. The central results are summarized as
follows:
Lemma 3.2 (Expenditures versus utility) Households’ total expenditures
(equal to ﬁrms’ gross revenue) as well as households’ gross utility decrease with
11the variance of marginal costs. The heterogeneity impact on households’ ex-
penditures, however, outweigh the heterogeneity impact on gross utility. Thus,
consumer surplus increases with the variance of marginal costs.
After a mean preserving cost variation which increases the variance of
marginal costs, households consume a more uneven distribution of quanti-
ties of the diﬀerent brands. Intuitively, this eﬀect makes consumers worse oﬀ
since it decreases households’ gross utility. But, the supply of the good which
is positively aﬀected by the cost variation increases disproportionately high.
The more eﬃcient ﬁrm oﬀers a bigger quantity and sell its product at a lower
price. This ’aggressive’ behavior is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm itself (cf. proposition
3.2). But, the increased supply of the ﬁrm which is positively aﬀected by the
cost variation suppresses the output of the less eﬃcient ﬁrm which is nega-
tively aﬀected by the variation. Declining households’ expenditures outweigh
diminishing gross utility and consumers are better oﬀ at the end.
In the following the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is analyzed
from another point of view. The impact on consumer surplus can be broken
down on the heterogeneity impact on the net beneﬁt of each single commodity.
Let CSi denote the net utility caused by the consumption of good i = 1,...,n
which is deﬁned as follows:









The term qi − 1
2q2
i reﬂects the direct utility caused by the consumption of
good qi. The term ν
2qiQ−i describes additional utility (or disutility) caused by
the simultaneous consumption of the n goods. The expenditures associated
with the consumption of commodity i is given by piqi. Consumer surplus CS is
just aggregated net utility of all n goods. According to (3.4) the heterogeneity
impact on the quantities of non-aﬀected ﬁrms and thus corresponding equi-
librium price is zero. Hence, net utility of the non-aﬀected goods is unchanged
in case of mean preserving cost variation since aggregated concurrence output
is unchanged. The heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is the sum of
the heterogeneity impacts on the aﬀected goods. The results concerning the
net utility of the aﬀected goods are summarized as follows:
Lemma 3.3 (Net utility of a single good) In case of a mean preserving
cost variation which increases the variance of marginal costs additional net
12utility of the good which is positively aﬀected by the cost variation outweighs
the loss of net utility of the good which is negatively aﬀected.



































































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on equilibrium output and equi-
librium price of the unaﬀected goods is zero. Since aggregated output just
depends on average marginal cost (cf. (2.2)) the heterogeneity impact on ag-
gregated concurrence output Q∗
−i is zero, too. Hence, the heterogeneity impact





































































i is given by p∗
i = 1 − q∗
i − νQ∗
−i for i = 1,...,n. Fur-
thermore, it holds: p∗
i = q∗
i + ci for i = 1,...,n. Thus, HICS
∗








































Remember that the heterogeneity impact on q∗
i is denoted by HIQ
∗
i. The
heterogeneity impact HIQ−k := ∂kQ∗
−k − ∂lQ∗
−k on aggregated concurrence




k. Since the equilibrium price
is given by p∗
i = q∗
i + ci the heterogeneity impact on p∗




∗ +HICi whereas HICi denotes the ’heterogeneity impact’ on the marginal






































k is negative HICS
∗
k is also negative irrespective the distribution of
marginal costs or the degree of substitutability ν. Similarly CSl can be derived














l yield the heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus given by (F.1). 
In case of a mean preserving variation which increases the variance the
additional net utility of the good which is positively aﬀected by the variation
outweighs the losses of net utility of the good which is negatively aﬀected even
though there is a diminishing marginal utility of each good. This is due to the
fact that declining expenditures associated with the consumption of the good
which is positively aﬀected overcompensates.
3.3 Social surplus
In view of the results of the previous sections the analysis of social surplus is
for the sake of completeness. In case of quasi-linear preferences social surplus









Since both producer surplus and consumer surplus increase with the vari-
ance of marginal costs, social surplus increase with the variance of marginal
costs, too. The following results are a direct implication of the results of the
previous sections.
Corollary 3.1 (Average Impact on social surplus) The average impact
on social surplus is positive (negative) if all ﬁrms are positively (negatively)
aﬀected by the cost variation.
This result is comparable to the homogeneous good case if inverse demand
is linear. As you can see in F´ evrier and Linnemer (2004) an increase of all
14marginal costs can be welfare enhancing if there are at least 3 ﬁrms in the
market, market heterogeneity is suﬃciently high and inverse demand is suﬃ-
ciently concave. In this case there is an output shift from less eﬃcient ﬁrms
to more eﬃcient ﬁrms. The welfare gains due to a more eﬃcient production
overcompensates welfare losses due to less consumer surplus. Since inverse de-
mand is linear in case of Dixit-utility an increase (a reduction) of all marginal
costs makes society unambiguously worse oﬀ (better oﬀ). The heterogeneity
impact on social surplus is given as follows:
Corollary 3.2 (Heterogeneity Impact) Social surplus increases with the
variance of marginal costs.
Even though this result is similar to the homogeneous good case there
is a small but signiﬁcant diﬀerence: Households’ gross utility decreases with
the variance of marginal costs. Diminishing total costs of production, how-
ever, outweigh and, therefore, social surplus increases with the dispersion of
marginal costs.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that in contrast to homogeneous good models not only pro-
ducer surplus but also consumer surplus increase with the variance of marginal
costs. Moreover, this paper shows that the positive relationship, especially be-
tween consumer surplus and market heterogeneity, not only holds true in verti-
cally diﬀerentiated good models but also in horizontally diﬀerentiated models
with cost asymmetry.9 Since my analysis also allows for the shutdown of a
suﬃciently ineﬃcient ﬁrms (i.e. q∗
i = 0) this analysis illustrates that the exis-
tence of ﬁxed costs is not necessary for a shutdown to be welfare enhancing.10
In this context my results are in line with those authors analyzing possible
negative welfare eﬀects of cost reductions.11 In contrast to this strand of liter-
9Symeonidis (2003) analyzes a vertically diﬀerentiated good oligopoly. Firms, however,
incur incur identical marginal costs. Quality diﬀerences are the sole reason for market
heterogeneity.
10Assuming Dixit-utility and a free-entry equilibrium Koh (2008) shows that the shutdown
of a ﬁrm is welfare enhancing if cost structure exhibits constant and identical marginal costs
since there is excessive entry.
11Cf. Lahiri and Ono (1988), Zhao (2001), Smythe and Zhao (2006) or Wang and Zhao
(2007).
15ature my results apply for the widest set of marginal costs combinations since
I require no upper limits for marginal costs and just assume a non-negative
equilibrium output of each ﬁrm. Therefore, my analysis is helpful for antitrust
authorities since it allows a better understanding of the relationship between
market heterogeneity and all surpluses, especially consumer surplus. More-
over, this paper helps to reduce prejudices that either a maximum of product
diversity is necessarily welfare enhancing or a market consisting of equipollent
ﬁrms provides favorable conditions for consumers.
Consumers must not worry about a mean preserving cost variation increas-
ing the variance of marginal costs. Consumers as well as producers are better
oﬀ in more heterogeneous market structures. Firms’ proﬁt maximizing behav-
ior is not necessarily at the expense of consumers surplus. Even though big
ﬁrms have a higher price-cost margin compared to smaller ﬁrms (remember
that equilibrium quantity equals respective price-cost margin) these ﬁrms pass
eﬃciency gains down to consumers by oﬀering a bigger quantity at a lower
price. Hence, a big price-cost margin rather indicates ﬁrms’ eﬃciency than
market power which is harmful for consumers.
Furthermore, my analysis rather supports the Chicago school of antitrust
than the Harvard business school since market structure (and thus market
concentration) is rather a result of the market process than a bad starting point
for competition as suspected by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.
A Utility
The quadratic utility according to Dixit (1979) is given as follows:








whereas q0 denotes the numeraire good and the matrix of substitution H





1 ν ··· ν
ν 1 ··· ν
. . .
. . . ... . . .




16Since the corresponding Hessian ∇2U = −H is real and symmetric, it
can be decomposed by P −1DP = −H whereas . Let denote D the matrix
which contains the Eigenvalues and the matrix P consists of the Eigenvalues
of the Hessian. You can prove the correctness by calculating −HP = PD. Cf.
J¨ anich (2002), p. 219.
D =

    

−1 + ν 0 ··· 0 0
0 −1 + ν ··· 0 0
. . . ... . . .
0 0 −1 + ν 0
0 0 ··· 0 [−1 − ν(n − 1)]





   
  

1 0 ··· 0 0 1
−1 1 ··· 0 0 1
0 −1 ··· 0 0 1
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ... −1 1 1
0 0 ... 0 −1 1

   
  

Consumers utility is concave if the corresponding Hessian is negative deﬁnit
which in turns is true, if all Eigenvalues are negative. Cf. K¨ onigsberger (1993),
p.74. Hence: −1 + ν < 0 ⇔ ν < 1 and −1 − ν(n − 1) < 0 ⇔ ν > − 1
n−1. Thus





















B Proof of lemma 2.1
Firm i = 1,...,n maximizes its proﬁt Πi = p(qi + Q−i)qi − ciqi choosing
an optimal qi. Note that inverse demand p(qi + Q−i) = 1 − qi − νQ−i is
given by (2.1). The ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm i = 1,...,n is given by





2 ν ··· ν
ν 2 ··· ν
. . .
. . . ... . . .
















   

Let denote A the matrix of coeﬃcients of q and cT = (1−c1,...,1−cn) the
vector of constants. Since A is real and symmetric the matrix of coeﬃcients
can be decomposed by A = PDP −1. Hence Aq = c can be expressed by
PDP −1q = c. Let denote P the matrix of Eigenvectors and D the diagonal
matrix containing the corresponding Eigenvalues. It is easy to proof that
λ1 = 2 − ν is an n − 1 fold Eigenvalue of A and λ2 = 2 + ν(n − 1) is the n-th






2 − ν 0 ··· 0 0
0 2 − ν ··· 0 0
. . . ... . . .
0 0 2 − ν 0











   

1 0 ··· 0 0 1
−1 1 ··· 0 0 1
0 −1 ··· 0 0 1
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ... −1 1 1
0 0 ... 0 −1 1

  
   

(B.2)
Just prove the accuracy of (B.1) and (B.2) by calculating AP = PD.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium q∗
i for i = 1,...,n is determined by solving
PDP −1q∗ = c in two steps. Firstly we solve PDz∗ = c for z∗ := P −1q. The
solution of q∗ can now easily be obtained by calculating q∗ = Pz∗. The optimal
vector z∗ must solve the following system of linear equations PDz∗ = c:
18
    
 

2 − ν 0 ··· 0 0 [2 + ν(n − 1)]
−(2 − ν) 2 − ν ··· 0 0 [2 + ν(n − 1)]
0 −(2 − ν) ··· 0 0 [2 + ν(n − 1)]
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ··· −(2 − ν) 2 − ν [2 + ν(n − 1)]
0 0 ··· 0 −(2 − ν) [2 + ν(n − 1)]


















Summing up the ﬁrst and the second row yields the new second row. The
new second row is added to the third row which again yields the new third
row and so on. The resulting row echelon form is given as follows:

     


2 − ν 0 ··· 0 0 [2 + ν(n − 1)]
0 2 − ν ··· 0 0 2[2 + ν(n − 1)]
0 0 ··· 0 0 3[2 + ν(n − 1)]
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
0 0 ··· 0 2 − ν (n − 1)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
0 0 ··· 0 0 n[2 + ν(n − 1)]











2 − c1 − c2
. . .







   










n[2 + ν(n − 1)]
(B.3)
Inserting z∗
n given by (B.3) in the row before last is given by
(2 − ν)z
∗
n−1 + (n − 1)[2 + ν(n − 1)]z
∗




yield the solution for z∗







(n − 1) −
n−1 X
i=1









(n − 1) −
n−1 X
i=1











(n − 1) −
n−1 X
i=1





















Since the equilibrium quantities q∗
i are given by q∗ = Pz∗, the solution
for q∗


























n[2 + (n − 1)ν]
=
(2 − ν) − 2−ν
n
Pn
i=1 ci + [2 + (n − 1)ν]
 Pn−1





(2 − ν)[2 + (n − 1)ν]
=
(2 − ν) − 2−ν
n
Pn
i=1 ci + 2
Pn−1
i=1 ci + (n − 1)ν
Pn−1
i=1 ci










(2 − ν)[2 + (n − 1)ν]










n (n − 1)ν

cn










(2 − ν)[2 + (n − 1)ν]
=



















(2 − ν)[2 + (n − 1)ν]
=
(2 − ν) − [2 + ν(n − 2)]cn + ν
Pn−1
i=1 ci
(2 − ν)[2 + (n − 1)ν]
(B.5)
Analogously the equilibrium outputs q∗
i for i = 1,...,n−1 can be derived.
Hence q∗




(2 − ν) − [2 + ν(n − 2)]ci + ν
P
j6=i ci
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]

C Proof of equation 2.3
In the following I show that equilibrium proﬁt Π∗
i of ﬁrm i = 1,...,n just
equals its squared quantity q∗
i. For this purpose I show that p∗
i − ci = q∗
i is
true. Equilibrium price p∗
i can be obtained by inserting equilibrium quantities
given by (B.5) in the inverse demand. It holds p∗
i − ci = 1 − q∗
i − νQ∗
−i − ci









(n − 1)(2 − ν) − [2 + ν(n − 2)]
P
j6=i cj + ν(n − 1)ci + ν(n − 2)
P
j6=i cj
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
It remains to show that p∗




i − ci = − q
∗
i +
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)] − ν(n − 1)(2 − ν)
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
+
−ν2(n − 1) − (2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
(2 − ν)[2 + ν(n − 1)]
ci
+
ν[2 + ν(n − 2)] − ν2(n − 2)]







2(2 − ν) + [−4 + (2 − n)2ν]ci + 2ν
P
j6=i cj









D Proof of lemma 3.1
The heterogeneity impact HIR







































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the output of the unaﬀected
ﬁrms is zero. Since p∗
i = q∗
i + ci the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium
price of the unaﬀected ﬁrms is zero. Thus, the heterogeneity impact on total







The heterogeneity impact on revenue of ﬁrm i HIR
∗


























































i denote the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium price of ﬁrm




i +ci the heterogeneity impact on market
price p∗











Let HICi := ∂kci − ∂lci denote the ’heterogeneity impact’ on the marginal





1, for i = k,











































i + ci) + HICi q
∗
i
Since the heterogeneity impact on the quantity and the marginal cost of the
unaﬀected ﬁrms j 6= k,l is zero and HIQk = −HIQl = −1
2−ν, the heterogeneity









k + ck) + q∗
k, for i = k,
1
2−ν(2q∗
l + cl) − q∗
l , for i = l,
0, else.
23Since 2HIQk +1 = −ν
2−ν the heterogeneity impact on the revenue of ﬁrm i




















2−νcl, for i = l,
= 0, else.
(D.5)
In case of substitutes (i.e. ν ≥ 0) the heterogeneity impact on revenue k
is negative and the heterogeneity impact on revenue l is positive. Note that
in case of complements this is not true in general. Hence the heterogeneity

































































< 0, for ck > cl,
= 0, for ck = cl,
> 0, for ck < cl.
(D.6)
Total revenue increases with the variance of marginal costs. This result
is true in case of substitutes and complements even though the heterogeneity
impact on revenue Rk must not be negative in case of complements (cf. (D.5)).




































































> 0, for ck < cl,
= 0, for ck = cl,
< 0, for ck > cl.
(D.7)
The heterogeneity impact on total costs is negative (positive) if the more
(less) eﬃcient ﬁrm is getting more eﬃcient. Obviously the heterogeneity im-








(ck − cl) <
−2(1 − ν)








For ck > cl diminishing total costs of production outweigh diminishing
gross revenue. For ck < cl the exact opposite holds true. Thus, the hetero-
geneity impact on producer surplus is positive (negative) if the more (less)
eﬃcient ﬁrm is getting more eﬃcient. Note that the heterogeneity impact on
producer surplus is just the diﬀerence between the heterogeneity impact on
revenue and total costs.
25E Proof of proposition 3.3


































∗ on consumer surplus in equi-

















































































Since market price p∗
i is given by p∗
i = q∗





















































Rearranging the terms deftly allows to factor out p∗





















































i − ci = q∗
























































i on the equilibrium output


















1 + ν(n − 1)










and Q∗ > 0 the average impact on
consumer surplus is positive (negative) if all ﬁrms are positively (negatively)
aﬀected by the cost variation. 
F Proof of proposition 3.4




∗ is derived. The partial derivatives ∂k CS



























































27The heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus HICS

















































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the equilibrium output of





































(2 − ν)2(ck − cl) (F.1)
The heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is positive (negative) if the
more ineﬃcient (eﬃcient) ﬁrm is getting more eﬃcient. 
28G Proof of lemma 3.2
Note that households expenditures just equal to ﬁrms total revenue which was
analyzed already in appendix D. Hence the heterogeneity impact on house-
holds expenditures is given by (D.6). Thus it remains analyzing the hetero-
geneity impact on consumers utility U(q∗
0,q∗
1,...,q∗





































































































According to (3.4) the heterogeneity impact on the output of the unaﬀected
ﬁrms is zero. Since HIQk = −HIQl it holds:
∂kU
∗ − ∂lU
∗ = HIQk p
∗

































(2 − ν)2(ck − cl) (G.1)
29The heterogeneity impact on consumer surplus is negative (positive) if the
more (less) eﬃcient ﬁrm is positively aﬀected by the cost variation. It is easy
to check that the heterogeneity impact on consumer expenditures outweighs















Since the heterogeneity impact on consumers expenditures outweighs the
heterogeneity impact on consumers utility the heterogeneity impact on con-
sumer surplus is positive (negative) if the more (less) eﬃcient ﬁrm is getting
more eﬃcient. 
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